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international context, a  recent OECD data set is used to compare the education of Irish
immigrants to their counterparts in other European economies.  The data suggest that Ireland's
immigrant population is remarkably skilled.  Immigrants of EU origin are positively self-
selected.  From outside the EU, some countries supply mainly skilled immigrants, while others
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issues in Irish immigration: the likely impact of EU accession of new member states, the
appropriateness of current immigration policy, and the relationship between current immigration
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Migration is one of the dominant themes in Irish economic history.  Over the last 200
years, it has been primarily a story of emigration.  The causes and consequences of large-scale
emigration out of Ireland have interested 19
th century pamphleteers and political economists
(Cairnes, 1873), contemporary economic historians (Hatton and Williamson, 1993, 1998; Ó
Gráda and O'Rourke, 1997), and economists interested in post-war Ireland (Walsh 1974;
Barrett 1999).  The last 15 years have seen a marked change in the pattern of Irish migration.
Ireland has experience positive net immigration since 1991.  This was initially due to large
flows of returning Irish emigrants, attracted by improved conditions in the Irish labour
market.
1   Since the late 1990s,  immigrant inflows have seen declining numbers of return
migrants, and increasing numbers of foreign-born migrants.  A considerable proportion of
foreign-born arrivals now consist of immigrants who have no prior ties to Ireland, and flows
are increasingly made up of immigrants from non-anglophone countries.  
The transformation of Irish migration has lead to a growing debate regarding
immigration policy.  This has been a major policy issue in North America since the mid-19
th
century, and within Europe since (at least) the end of the Second World War.  Less than 20
years after the end of emigration, it appears that Ireland faces the same challenges as her
partners in the European Union, and other immigrant-receiving countries around the world.   I
begin this paper with a review of the lessons that can be drawn from the experiences of other
immigrant receiving economies.  Labour economists have documented how policy  regimes
and economic conditions can shape  the size and the composition of immigrant inflows.
There are also substantial lessons to be drawn from historical research.  International
migration one hundred years ago was largely unconstrained by formal policy; analyses of past
1 Positive net immigration also occurred in the 1970s, as expatriate Irish returned to Ireland in response to
improved economic conditions.  (Barrett 1999) 
1immigrant flows can tell us much about where migration pressure is likely to be most intense,
as well as the likely composition of flows over time.
In light of the key themes emerging from the historical experiences of other countries,
I then offer a preliminary examination of  recent Irish immigration.  Are the new immigrants
predominantly skilled or unskilled?  Has the shift in immigrant sources led to a decline in
skills (and likely earnings capacity) among immigrants?  Some evidence has been produced
based on the distribution of work permits across sectors and nationality (Ruhs 2003).  I use a
recently released OECD database of immigrant education attainment across member states to
examine these questions.  The information contained in this database, while far from perfect,
allows Irish immigrants to be placed in a broader international context.      
Evidence on immigrant skills can be brought to bear in identifying key issues in Irish
immigration policy.  Prior to 2004, most economic migrants would fall into one of two
categories.  Immigrants from the European Economic Area (EEA) have had unfettered access
to the Irish labour market since 1992.  Evidence on their educational attainment should tell us
something about how Irish immigrants are self-selected under a laissez-faire policy regime.
Other economic immigrants to Ireland require a work permit or work visa.
2    While Ireland
appears to have been fairly liberal in issuing permits to employers looking to import workers
from abroad, the conditions imposed on permit-holders are quite restrictive.  Permits and
visas are limited in duration, and tie employees to a particular employer, or in the case of a
visa, to a particular occupation.  With the accession of ten new countries to the European
Union in 2004, the policy regime facing some of Ireland's leading sources of immigrants has
seen a major change.   Citizens of the accession countries now have free access to the Irish
2 Ireland is also beginning to receive substantial numbers of non-economic migrants.  About 48 thousand
applications for asylum were processed between 1999 and 2003.  Student visas are another source of
immigrants to Ireland.  There is some debate as to whether student immigrants are motivated by economic
conditions or the desire to enter the Irish labour market.  Non-EEA student visas currently allow the holder to
work for up to 20 hours a week, a more generous entitlement than in many other immigrant receiving
economies.  
2labour market, and there does appear to have been a surge in accession country immigrants
since May 1 2004.
3  Will accession immigrants swamp the Irish labour market?  Are post-
accession immigrants likely to resemble pre-accession flows from this region?  For
continuing immigration from outside of the EEA, the nature of immigration policy will
remain important.  Is the current orientation towards temporary migration appropriate, or
should a scheme favouring permanent migration be considered?  Economics theory and
evidence from Ireland and around the world can again be marshaled to help select among the
alternatives.  
The final point considered in this paper are the long-run implications of the
broadening of migration into Ireland.  While the absolute numbers of immigrants entering
Ireland are small, they almost certainly represent the first link in a chain of potential migrants
stretching back to the home country.  Migration for the purposes of family reunification is
likely to follow the arrival of the first generation of economic migrants.  How will this affect
the skill distribution of the immigrant population and overall conditions in the Irish economy?
The paper will conclude with some speculative comments on these issues.  
Immigration and immigration policy: issues and evidence
Immigration and the host economy
One of the most debated aspects of immigration is the potential impact on host
country economies.  If immigration is likely to have a major impact on conditions, identifying
the economic aims of immigration policy must be placed near the front of the policy agenda.
Economists have presented a range of reasons as to how immigration could impact upon a
host economy.  One of the classic questions is the impact that immigration might have on the
wages and employment of the existing population.  If immigration can be is treated as a shock
3 These immigrants are restricted, however, in their access to state-funded social benefits.
3to the supply side of the economy, simple economic theory would predict that host country
wages and employment would be adversely affected.  While the theory is straightforward,
identifying the actual impact of immigration on labour markets has proved elusive.
Economists have applied a range of techniques to assess the relationship between
immigration and conditions in host labour markets, and there is little consensus as to whether
immigration does have a substantial impact on native outcomes.
4  Scholars of 19
th century
migration, however, argue that international migration under laissez-faire conditions had
profound effects on economic conditions around the globe.  Hatton and Williamson (1998)
report that US wages would have been 10-14 percent higher in 1910 in the absence of post-
1870 immigration.  Work by O'Rourke and Williamson (1999) suggests that the major labour
market impacts of migration were felt in the emigrant-sending countries, where migration
caused wages to rise rapidly, stimulating convergence with destinations in the New World.
Both branches of research stress the potential for distributional effects.  O'Rourke and
Williamson (1999) argue that the 19
th century mass migration of predominantly unskilled
labour from Europe to the US increased American inequality, leading to demands for
restrictive migration policy.
5  Whether the divergence between historical and present-day
findings is a result of differences in econometric techniques, or differences in the scale of
migration,  is open to debate.  A sensible interpretation may be that migration at rates
common in contemporary economies will have moderate effects on receiving labour markets,
and substantial effects on labour markets in the origin  Distributional issues, related to the
skills of incoming workers in the host economy, will be of critical importance. 
Another area of interest is the interaction of immigration and the welfare state.
4 Friedberg and Hunt (1995) surveys the literature as of the mid-1990s.  A recent study by Borjas (2003),
however, offers convincing evidence that immigration-induced increases in labour supply do have substantial
effects on wages.
5 Goldin (1994) outlines the link between migration and the emergence of restrictive immigration policies in
the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries. 
4Immigration could prove costly if migrants make disproportionate use of social benefits.  On
the other hand, an immigration policy that favours the entry of young active workers could
reduce dependency ratios in rich economies that feature ageing populations, thus helping to
sustain the social safety net in the longer run.  Most studies of social assistance recipiency
find that immigrants are less likely to take up social assistance than demographically similar
natives.  The key words, however, are “demographically similar”.  If immigrants have lower
labour market capacities than native-born workers, they will make disproportionate use of
social assistance.  Economies in continental Europe have seen rising rates of recipiency
accompany declining immigrant skill over the course of the 1990s (Brücker et al, 2001).
While immigration can add fresh young workers to an aging population, it is unlikely that
immigration can have a substantial impact on dependency ratios.  Green and Green (1999)
report that a trebling of (disproportionately young) Canadian inflows over a fifty-year period
would reduce the proportion of the population over the age of 65 by only 5 percent.  As a
whole, it appears that so long as immigrants have the skills to succeed in host country labour
markets, they are unlikely to have a major impact on the sustainability of the welfare state.  
A further argument  is that immigrants can fill economic needs not met by the native
labour force.  This perspective holds that immigration policy can be a useful method to fill
occupations in which domestic workers are in short supply, and may also have a role in
expanding the human capital endowment of the host economy.
6   Arguments in favour of
migration to fill short-term requirements in the labour force have shaped migration policy on
both sides of the Atlantic.  Many European economies have operated temporary migration
policies to fill “gaps” in domestic labour supply.  The employer-driven allocation of work
6 A related argument, though one I will not examine in great detail here, is that national economies may feature
increasing returns to scale.  Some scholars argue that greater population size promotes innovation, and thus
immigration can lead to enhanced  productivity.  While the link between population size and productivity
growth is a key assumption in recent theoretical models of the long-run transition from economic stagnation
to sustained growth, there is little historical evidence to support this view.  (Voth 2003)
5permits in Ireland would appear to work along this lines.  Employers are entitled to apply for
work permits to fill positions for which suitable candidates who do not require work permits
are unavailable.  Policies oriented towards permanent migration often reward potential
immigrants in categories in high demand, and restrict migration into protected or high-
unemployment occupations.  
In the context described above, immigration policy is best seen as a potential
substitute for education policy, and the relevant question is whether targeted migration is a
superior approach to dealing with occupational shortages.  In economies where permanent
migration policy is the norm, the main shortcomings are that it is difficult to identify what
sectors ought to be targeted, and that many immigrants do not enter their intended
occupations after migration  (Green 1995).  Green and Green (1995) document the declining
importance of occupational targeting as part of the Canadian point system, while Bauer and
Zimmermann (1999) give this difficulty a major role in their argument against  the adoption
of a point system for European Union countries.  As Green and Green (1999) conclude, it is
likely that workers “on the ground”, be they immigrant or native, will do a better job of
targeting high-demand occupations than will a migration policy that is costly to change.
7   In
the case of an employer-led temporary migration policy, immigrants are recruited to directly
positions that have not been filled by non-immigrant (or in the Irish case, non-EEA) labour.
Immigrants are by definition filling “gaps”, but there are reasons to be hesitant regarding this
policy orientation.  Labour market conditions change over time, meaning that current
immigrants may not have skills suited for the “gaps” that emerge in the future.  This would is
not a major concern if a policy of temporary contracted migration is enforced; today's
temporary migrants  will return to their homelands upon the expiry of their permits, to be
7 Another style of analysis, as seen in Borjas (1995), considers an economy characterised by a production
function in which skilled labour, unskilled labour, and capital are employed as factors of production.  This
model suggests that the “surplus” from immigration, will be larger if immigration tends towards skilled
individuals if capital and skilled labour are complementary.  
6replaced by migrants with skills more suited to the changed conditions in the domestic labour
market.  The enforcement of return migration is crucial for this policy to succeed; however,
empirical evidence from migration regimes around the world suggest that temporary
migration tends to transform itself into permanent migration.
8  If, after accounting for the risk
of deportation, labour market opportunities for illegal immigrants (having remained past the
expiry of their work permit, without renewal) exceed the opportunities at home, one would
expect immigrants to attempt to remain in the host economy.  Various schemes have been
attempted to enforce the return of temporary immigrants, and most have met with little
success.
9  If temporary migration results in the recruitment of immigrants who are less able to
adapt to changing conditions in the host economy, the tendency of these migrants to linger
will place additional demands on the welfare state and will likely stimulate anti-immigrant
sentiment among the native population.
Other proponents of immigration point to the investment generated by migrants, and
the trade links created by migration flows between source and destination economies.  The
notion that investment and trade will follow the settlement of certain types of immigrants is
often used to motivate the recruitment of “investor immigrants.”  This is a feature of current
Irish policy, with business permits being issued to nationals countries outside the EEA and
states with Association Agreements who are willing to invest €300,000 in the establishment
of a business in Ireland.  Evidence from Canada suggests, however, that while trade and
immigration are linked, it appears that the volume of independent immigrants is a better
predictor of trade flows than the volume of investor class immigrants (Head and Ries 1998).
While trade does appear to follow the arrival of immigrants, it is likely that there are rapidly
8 Epstein, Hillman, and Weiss (1999) demonstrate conditions under which under guest-worker programs result
in populations of illegal immigrants.
9 One exception is a recent policy in Israel under which temporary migrants are forced to save part of their
legal earnings, which are received by the worker as a lump sum upon departure from Israel (Brücker et al,
2001, p. 134)
7diminishing returns to additional flows in this regard (Green and Green 1997).  It is also not
evident that investor immigrants will have a substantial marginal effect on inward investment.
In economies that are open to international capital flows, the investment that accompanies
immigrants will essentially crowd out additional capital imports.
A final consideration would be the possible benefits to having a population with
greater diversity.  Lazear (2000) argues that gains from trade exist in interactions between
individuals of different backgrounds.  This theory proposes that individuals of different
backgrounds possess different sets of knowledge; the less overlap between the knowledge of
interacting individuals, the larger the gains that can be made by the transmission of
knowledge through the process of interaction.  Gains from diversity imply that a policy of
“balanced” immigration is desirable.  The model also reminds us of the importance of general
human capital: for the gains of diversity to be realised, immigrants and natives with disjoint
backgrounds must be able to communicate in a common language.  From the perspective of
the host economy, immigrants who can speak the local language (or are more likely to rapidly
acquire fluency) offer greater potential benefit.  
Who migrates?
Much of the above discussion  suggests that the net benefits to be captured by setting
an immigration policy to achieve economic aims are largely illusory.  This is reflected in
recent quantitative studies of prospective migratory scenarios in Europe.
10  The skills of
immigrants, however, do likely matter: if migrants do not possess sufficient general human
capital to adjust to conditions in the host economy, the potential costs of  immigration are
heightened, as are any distributional consequences.    Many contemporary studies argue that
10As an illustrative example, simulations of the potential impact of East-West migration in Europe on large
states like Germany and the UK has been estimated to be in the order of one percent of GDP – a positive impact
if flow consist of skilled workers, and a negative impact if flows are dominated by the unskilled (Bauer and
Zimmerman, 1999).
8immigrant skills are closely associated with immigrant origin.  Immigration is strictly
controlled in most present-day economies through the use of quotas, permits, and other
administrative methods, and these tools may play an important role in shaping the origins of
the immigrant population.  An important question is how large flows would be, and from
what destinations, in an environment of laissez-faire migration.  An understanding of the
determinants of migration in such an environment can help generate informed predictions as
to how the international mobility of labour will evolve when migration barriers are reduced.
In the Irish context, particular interest is directed at future flows from the accession countries
to the European Union, as their nationals now have virtually unfettered access to Irish labour
markets.  
Evidence from late 19
th and early 20
th century migration towards the New
World offers a long run perspective on the forces driving migratory flows.  Hatton and
Williamson  (1998) model European emigration to the New World between 1860 and 1913.
They find that while economic conditions at home and abroad were important determinants of
migration flows, demographic factors also have an important role to play.  Population growth
in the source has a strong impact on future migration in their model, and the size of the
emigrant stock abroad plays an important role in reinforcing migration trends over the long
run.  Economic historians have also used the framework of a gravity model to examine
immigration to “open” American labour markets in the late 19
th century  (for example,
Dunlevy and Saba 1992).  One important result in this literature is that distance plays a strong
role in determining the size of flows, with source countries closer to the Atlantic seaboard (or
in the case of Canada, on the other side of the 49
th parallel) supplying more immigrants to the
United States, all else equal.  These findings are unlikely to surprise many economists, but
they can be put to good use in determining the migration potential of source regions.
9Immigration is more likely to become a flood when the destination is close, an expatriate
community already in place, and the source economy replete with young, unattached workers.
Emigration is also a self-limiting process; as economic and demographic conditions at home
change, demand for migration will attenuate quite rapidly  (O'Rourke, 2004).
A second branch of migration research focuses on the nature of immigrant
self-selection within source economies.  Whether sources supply immigrants from the top or
bottom end of their domestic kill distribution will also affect the composition of immigration
and the result of any economic calculations as to the attractiveness of migration.  What forces
are likely to influence the selection of who migrates?  Economic theories of individual
migration typically treat the decision to emigrate as an investment decision  (Sjaastad 1962).
Potential migrants compare the present value of the benefits of migration – the discounted
future stream of higher earnings associated with residence and work abroad – with the costs
of migration. As identified by Borjas (1987), the benefits to migration may vary across
individuals in accordance with their skills.  Economies that feature high levels of dispersion
in earnings offer better returns to skilled workers, and are predicted to be attractive to skilled
migrants originating in source countries with less dispersed earnings.  Destinations which
feature low income inequality will prove more attractive to the relatively unskilled who
originate in regions with more dispersed earnings.  The the relationship between source
country and economic performance has been an area of intense interest to labour economists.
Findings from contemporary labour markets suggest that the shift from European sources to
developing countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia, has led to declining  skill and
earnings capacity.  (Borjas 1985, 1994; Brücker et al 2001).  Historical evidence is more
nuanced; a comparison of “old” and “new” immigrants in the early 20
th century United States
indicates that the “new” immigrants from southern and eastern Europe had steeper earnings
10profiles than the “old” immigrants (Minns 2001).  It may be that the crucial element is not the
origin of the migrants, but rather the intentions of immigrants once arrived in the source
economy. The demographic characteristics of immigrants to North America one hundred
years ago are those of economic migrants in search of labour market opportunities; recent
migration flows to mature economies feature large numbers of migrants seeking family
reunification with relatives already resident in the source country.  Economic migrants from
developing countries today may have high potential earnings capacity, but this is obscured by
increasing non-economic migration from the same place of origin.
A picture of Irish immigrant skill
How can lessons from historical and international evidence help in framing the present
day immigration debate in Ireland?  We first need to establish the nature of recent migration
into Ireland.  It is now well known that return migration to Ireland has declined, and that
returnees and immigrants from Britain and the United States are being replaced by
immigrants from the EEA (as it stood in April 2004) and other sources further afield.
Therefore, Irish immigration has quite rapidly begun to shift away from being composed
primarily of individuals with some familiarity with customs and institutions in Ireland and the
broader anglophone world. Where are the immigrants coming from, and has Ireland been able
to attract skilled individuals as part of these flows?  
A recently released OECD dataset reports on the size of the stock of immigrants for all
member nations in 2002, with these stock further subdivided by country of birth and
educational status.
11  Ideally one would like to have this information for the flow of
immigrants into Ireland since 1998, but given the recent nature of the “new” immigration to
11 The Irish component of the OECD database is drawn from the 2001 Census of population.  For most other
OECD countries, the data is derived from Census records in 2001, 2002, or the most recent available year.
See Dumont and Lemaître (2003), for preliminary work with this data.
11Ireland, the composition of immigrant stocks from most sources other than the US and UK
should be a fairly close match to the underlying flows in the past 5 years.
12  Evidence on the
uptake of work permits is another good indicator of the leading sources of Irish immigrants.
These figures are informative regarding the flows of certain types of immigrants from certain
destinations, but do not identify EU immigrants or other migrants arriving in Ireland through
avenues other than the possession of a work permit. 
Table 1 lists the top twenty sources of Irish immigrants in 2002.  Column (1) lists the
stock of immigrants from each source country present in the Census of that year.  Columns
(2) and (3) offer two measures of the educational attainment of the stock from each source
country: the proportion having tertiary  education, and the proportion possessing only primary
education.  Unsurprisingly, Great Britain and the United States head the list of immigrant
stocks.  While immigrants from the the UK are not particularly skilled, the majority of
Americans in Ireland have attended college or university.  Below these two countries, we see
a mix of nearby and distant sources.  Anglophone source countries are important, with almost
19,000 immigrants hailing from South Africa, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.  The
education data for these origin groups suggest skill levels that are quite similar to those of
American immigrants.  EU-15 sources also figure prominently, with German, French,
Spanish, Italian and Dutch immigrants represented in Table 1.  The include considerable
numbers of recent arrival.  Of the 27 thousand immigrants from France, Germany, Italy,
Spain, and the Netherlands, over 11 thousand (about 40 percent) arrived in Ireland after 1996,
with more than half of French, Italian, and Spanish migrants having been in Ireland less than
5 years in 2002.  EU immigrants can migrate freely to Ireland, and their characteristics give a
good picture of the nature of migrant self-selection between Ireland and her neighbours.  The
12 The stock of immigrants in Ireland is included as part of the tabulations from the 1996 Census of population.
Unfortunately, the available data for 1996 is less informative as regards country of origin, with by-birthplace
stocks listed only the UK and the EU-15. 
12message that one would take from this table is that EU immigrants in Ireland are if anything
more skilled than their Anglophone counterparts from North America, Oceania, and Southern
Africa.  
Outside of the (old) EEA and the English-speaking world, three developments can be
highlighted.  The first is the presence of large numbers of immigrants from Eastern Europe.
Russia and Latvia appear on the list in Table 1; Poland, Lithuania, and the Ukraine lie just
outside of the top 20.  Immigrants from these countries take up a large proportion of the work
permits issued in Ireland (especially prior to May 2004).  At first glance, Table 1 suggests that
there is considerable variance in skills among Central and Eastern European immigrants to
Ireland; among Romanian and Latvian immigrants, over 30 percent lack a secondary
education.  Immigrants from Russia, however, have similar educational attainment to most
western European immigrant groups in Ireland.  This split across Central and Eastern
European source countries persists in those just missing the list in Table 1.  Only 35 percent
of Polish immigrants and 30 percent of Lithuanian immigrants have third-level qualifications,
while the majority of Ukrainian and Belorussian arrivals did.  Asian immigrants have made a
substantial foothold in Ireland. These immigrants also account for a large proportion of Irish
work permits, particularly arrivals from the Philippines and the Indian sub-continent.  Over
two-thirds of Philippine, Indian, and Pakistani immigrants have a third-level education, while
less than fifty  percent of Chinese and Malaysian immigrants have the same level of
qualifications.  Table 1 also confirms the important presence of the Nigerian community in
Ireland, who appear to be roughly mid-table in terms of education among immigrants.
13      
13 Note that Nigerians dominate demands for asylum in Ireland, with about 35 percent of asylum applications in
2003.
13The final column in Table 1 lists average educational attainment at home for the
twenty source countries under consideration.
14  A quick glance at the figures makes clear that
the average education of immigrant populations in Ireland bears little relationship to average
educational attainment at home.  Among the relatively wealthy countries listed, the best
educated immigrants appear to come from France and Spain, which, by European standards,
have low levels of average education at home.  Eastern Europeans are on average about as
well-educated as their counterparts in the West, but it is clear that Ireland has not received as
favourable a draw from many of these populations.  The figures for Asian immigrant in Table
1 confirms  the overall pattern; some groups are highly-skilled, others less so, and these
differences hold little relationship with average educational attainment at home.  The data as
a whole suggest that Irish immigrants are predominantly economic migrants, with
characteristics shaped by the self-selective nature of flows between particular source
countries and Ireland.
National origin and education in an international context
In Table 2, I extend the analysis of immigrant educational to a subset of fellow
European economies.  The educational attainment of the Irish “top 20” is compared to
immigrants of the same origin in France, Belgium, Spain, and the United Kingdom.  The
reader should use some caution in making comparisons based on Table 2.  Self-reported
measures of education are often overstated, and whether the qualifications of all immigrants
should be treated as equivalent to domestic qualifications is open to debate.  The figures
presented are also subject to the caveat that there may be important demographic differences
between immigrant groups within and across countries.  Many European economies have
14 The data refer to average years of schooling in each source country among the population aged 15 years and
above.  The source is Barro and Lee (2000).
14immigrant communities much longer established than those in Ireland, and it is possible that
older immigrants have a very different distribution of (relative) skills than do recent arrivals.
With these limitations in mind, what can be concluded from the numbers on display?  Most
striking is the evidence that Ireland's immigrants are highly skilled, relative to foreign-born
populations in other European economies.  For 12 of 20 source countries, the Irish-resident
group is has the largest proportion with higher education.  Earlier studies (Brücker et al ,
2001) have attribute the education profile of Irish immigrants to high skill levels among
immigrants originating in the the United States, but it is clear from Table 3 that recent years
have seen Ireland attract highly-educated immigrants from both high-income and low-income
countries.  Caution is required in comparing Ireland's young, recently educated immigrant
stock with the more seasoned immigrants of other European economies.  However, the bulk
of research on European migration suggests that the skills of recent immigrants have declined
relative to earlier waves of immigrants, and this is usually thought to reflect the changing
composition of the source of immigrants since 1990.  In terms of education, there is less
evidence of a similar trend accompanying the rise of the “new” immigration in Ireland. 
While the above analysis suggests that Irish immigrants are skilled by international
standards, some of the relatively large immigrant groups do not appear to be as skilled as the
equivalent communities in other European economies.  In particular, Ireland does not appear
to fare as well in selecting immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe; Irish immigrants
from Romania and Latvia are poorly educated relative to those found in other EU economies.
As Central and Eastern Europeans have migrated in increasingly large numbers to Ireland
since 2002, lower levels of education among this group could lead to an unraveling of the
relatively positive picture suggested thus far.  
 
15Self-selection,  migration policy, and immigrant skill
Recent Irish immigrants are predominantly economic migrants, and as such their skills
are unrepresentative of “average” skill levels at home.  The evidence on education suggests
that there is little reason to presume that the potential fortunes of the immigrant population
will decline as the primary source for immigrants shift from countries with high average skill
levels to countries with low average skill levels .  This does not imply, however, that
economic conditions at home and abroad are unimportant in shaping the character of
immigrant flows between Ireland and particular source countries.  The structure of earnings in
Ireland relative to the source country may be important determinant of immigrant skill levels.
Migration choices are also constrained by immigration policy.  In this section, I assess what
can be learnt through an examination of the skill composition of immigrant flows entering
Ireland under different policy environments.
EEA immigration
Immigrants from the European Economic Area have had free access to Irish labour
markets since 1992.  Therefore, their migration decision are a true test of self-selection; no
policy is in place to limit intake to the highly skilled or those who have established contact
with particular employers.  Given freedom of movement between Ireland and the rest of the
EU, it is likely that the returns to skill play an important role in determining who chooses to
locate in Ireland.  Can the self-selection hypothesis espoused by Borjas (1987) explain the
patterns of labour mobility within the EU?   Pane A of Table 2 lists the ratio of incomes at the
90
th and 10
th percentiles for a selection of EU states.
15  This measure of income inequality can
be interpreted as a rough proxy for the returns to skills across the countries.  These data
suggest that Ireland is near the top of the EU on this measure, and well above most
15 The figures are drawn from Nolan and Smeeding (2004)
16continental members.  When absolute levels of income are considered, Nolan and Smeeding
(2004) estimate that the gap between the top and bottom ten percent in Ireland is equal to
$32,473 US dollars at 2000 PPP, compared to $29,960 for the UK, $22,510 for the
Netherlands, and $21,830 for Germany.  
That Ireland leads the European table of income inequality is quite possibly an
undesirable policy outcome, but the implications for migration, particularly within the EU,
are important.  High returns to skill in Ireland appear to have attracted highly educated
immigrants from continental Europe.  These flows may have served to dampen further rises in
inequality, much as the return of skilled expatriate Irish in the early 1990s are thought to have
had a similar effect (Barret, FitzGerald, and Nolan, 2002).  
 
Non-EEA immigration
  In the Irish case, economic migrants who do not possess EEA passports require a
work permit or work visa to participate in the Irish labour market.  Work permits, for which
the employer makes the application, legitimize the work relationship between a particular
employer and employee.    For a permit to be granted, the employer must establish that they
have been unable to fill the employment position with an individual who does not require
similar authorization
16.  Immigrants who enter Ireland on this basis do not have the
opportunity to search for employment that better matches their skills.  These permits are
usually granted for a period of 12 months, and work permit holder are not entitled to state-
funded medical care, education, or social welfare.  The work permit scheme has recently been
complemented by a work visa and work authorisation scheme.  Since 2000, potential
employees in sectors featuring labour shortages having secured a job offer in Ireland can
16 The letter of the law states that employers must advertise position nationally and throughout the EEA for a
minimum of four weeks before searching for workers outside of the EEA.
17receive employment clearance before immigrating to Ireland.
17  Work visas are granted for a
two-year period, and holders of these permits are allowed to change employers, so long as
they remain in the same occupational class.  While holders of these visas do not have the right
to state-funded medical care, education, or social welfare, they may be accompanied by
spouses and dependent children, with minors under the age of 18 being eligible for state-
funded primary and secondary education.
18
Table 4 provides a statistical overview of the recipients of work permits in Ireland.
The first three columns lists the number of work permits issued to national groups in the years
between 2002 and 2004.  Columns four and five summarize the proportion of immigrants
from each source region with third-level education in Ireland and across the entire OECD.
Where Ireland appears to have done particularly well in attracted highly educated immigrants
is from countries with strong Anglophone traditions (due to being colonies of either Great
Britain or the United States) in the developing world.  In particular, consider the case of
immigrants from the Philippines, India, and Pakistan.  It is likely that there is a relatively
larger pool skilled workers from these countries who are fluent in English than is the case
among their counterparts in South America or Eastern Europe.  The employer-led permit
system would also facilitate the recruitment of skilled labour from these countries; English-
speaking recruiters can verify credentials at lower cost than in economies that do not have the
same extent of Anglophone traditions.  Skilled workers from Central and Eastern Europe may
be more attracted to migration possibilities offered on a permanent basis.  In the Canadian
case, for example, a match with an employer is not required prior to migration, which means
that immigrants can concentrate on investing in host-country specific human capital before
beginning an employment relationship.  The OECD data on immigrant education  supports
17 Occupational categories covered by this scheme include positions in information and computing technology,
construction professionals, and medical professionals.
18 Visa holders must have been in Ireland for three months before being joined by their family.
18this hypothesis.  The percentage of the Canadian adult immigrant stock with third-level
education from the former Soviet Union (49), Romania (54), Latvia (40), Lithuania (32), and
Poland (35) match or exceed the figures for the same stocks in Ireland.
19  Brazilian
immigrants in Canada are also more likely to have some college or university training than
their Irish counterparts (49 percent versus 25).  Once again, these comparisons must be
interpreted carefully, as demographic differences between these groups will are likely related
to educational attainment.  At first glance, however, the comparison suggests that a policy of
permanent  migration (complemented by a points system, as discussed in more detail below),
may be more effective in attracting immigrants with higher levels of general human capital
who lack host-country specific human capital.    
Table 5 lists the distribution of work permits by occupation for leading sources of
Irish immigrants.  Anglophone immigrants from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the
United States are concentrated in professional-type occupations, with weekly wages ranging
from €750 to €1200 in 2002.
20  Asian immigrants also have substantial presence in the top
end of the occupational distribution, but personal and protective service emerges and a
dominant category in many cases.  This is an extremely heterogeneous category, as it includes
workers engaged in domestic service, with weekly wages of about €250, catering employees,
as well as nursing and other medical serviced, where weekly wages are over €700.   Eastern
European migrants are much more concentrated in agriculture, “other services, and “other”
occupations, where weekly pay tends to be in the order of €280 to €350.  These figures
present a much less flattering portrait of immigrants entering under permit than do the data on
education.  The educational qualifications many of these groups would suggest greater
19 Immigrants in Canada who identify themselves as Russian have similar third-level qualifications to those in
Ireland (57 versus 61).  Canadian-based Ukrainians are less well educated than their Irish counterparts (42
percent have third-level education), but these immigrants are likely much older than Ukrainian-born residents
of Ireland.
20 All wage figures are drawn from Ruhs (2003), Figure 19.
19earnings capacity than the typical wage offers received by permit holders.  A possible
explanation is that despite the limitations imposed by the Irish permit system, relatively well-
educated immigrants are willing to engage in service employment in order to gain a foothold
in the Irish labour market.  Immigrants may arrive in Ireland on an initial permit under the
expectation that they will be able to obtain a better match upon its expiry if they are “on the
ground” in Ireland to search for future employment.  
Immigration and the future
Accession and immigration
Prior to 2004, economic migrants from Eastern European would require work permits
or visas.  A substantial number of permit-holding European migrants were from the ten
accession countries.  How will migration from these sources be changes with the accession of
these states to the European Union?  The first question that might be asked is whether
accession is likely to trigger a flood of immigrants from these states.  While preliminary
evidence on the uptake of PPS numbers suggests that accession country migrants have been
coming to Ireland in increasing numbers since May 1 2004, geography and demographics
suggest that a “flood” of migrants to Ireland from these countries is unlikely.  One reason is
that there are major European economies much closer to most of the accession countries – in
particular, Germany, which already has substantial communities of migrants from these
countries.  Distance from home, and the size of the expatriate community in the destination,
remain important determinant of the size of immigrant flows.  Another reason is that the
demographics of the accession countries do not favour mass migration to richer markets in
the EU.  The demographic structure of the accession countries is very much like that of their
new European partners; In Ireland, 24 percent of the population is aged between 20 and 34,
20which are often through to be prime ages for potential emigration.  In Germany, the largest
EU economy, the corresponding figure is 19 percent.  For Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland,
accession countries which dominate recent flows into Ireland, the proportions aged 20 to 34
are 21, 20, and 23 percent.  A temporary rise in migration post-accession from these countries
is likely as they become better integrated into the wider European economy, but there seems
little reason to suspect that accession will release a raging stream of pent-up potential
immigrants.
How will accession affect the skill composition of Irish immigrants?  If  one were to
project based on the skills of the stock in 2002, increasing migration from accession countries
would be predicted to drive down the average skills (and presumed earnings capacity) of the
immigrant population, a trend that would exacerbate income inequality and perhaps
encourage developing anti-immigrant sentiment.  However, evidence for existing EU
immigrants suggests that this is not the most likely development.  Now that immigrants from
the accession countries can freely self-select migration to the EU, theory would predict that
Ireland will attract the highly-skilled, as it has from existing EU member states.  Self-
selection theory would predict this outcome, as income inequality in Ireland exceeds that in
most of the accession countries.  Panel B of Table 3 lists decile ratios for a sample of EU
accession states.  With the exception of Estonia, where language ties make Finland a major
immigrant destination, these are well below the ratio reported in Ireland (panel A).
21  This
prediction is subject to the caveat that the impact of accession on the distribution of incomes
in the accession countries is unknown.  If inequality increases as a consequence, the
incentives to migrate to Ireland would likely shift as well.  
21 Estimates of Gini indices for Latvia and Lithuania, two accession states not included in Table 2, are typically
smaller than corresponding estimates for Ireland (World Bank, 2004).
21Permits or permanence?
The current system of admitting immigrants to Ireland is one that encourages
temporary, rather than permanent migration.  Is it likely that this system is to prove the most
desirable in the longer run?  A temporary policy seems attractive if one is interested primarily
in remedying labour shortages,  and wishes to avoid the potential costs of changing ethnicity
associated with permanent migration.  Consider, however,  the the earlier discussion
regarding the economics of immigration policy.  Temporary migration is unlikely to remain
temporary, so long as economic conditions in Ireland are attractive to potential immigrants.
Even if the individual immigrants currently in Ireland on permits were to return home, the
“friends and family” effect will likely operate through the information about Irish institutions
and conditions that they would take back to their home economies.  This will spawn future
demand for migration to Ireland, be it through the permit system or through illegal
employment on the black market.    
The potential benefits and distributional consequences of immigration are linked to
the skills of migrants.   An important question, therefore, is how permanent and temporary
migration policies may influence the self-selection of workers who wish to reside in Ireland.
The evidence suggests that potential permanent immigrants from EEA economies are highly
educated, while immigrants arriving through the permit regime are more mixed.  It is
plausible that contracted  temporary migration, at least under the restrictive regime imposed
in Ireland,  may be unappealing to some workers with high levels of general human capital.
The restrictions placed on immigrants' ability to search for employment once in Ireland
provides employers with a degree of monopsony power over their immigrant work force.  If
immigrants with high levels of general human capital sacrifice much of the return to their
22skills if they are unable to complement their pre-migration human capital with post-migration
job search, flows may be diverted towards less skilled immigrants with less to sacrifice in
terms of potential earnings.  It is hard to see how a policy that restricts immigrants from
outside the expanded EEA into the full set of opportunities available in the Irish labour
market is likely  to enhance the selection of skills among arriving immigrants.  Low
unemployment and high returns to skill currently make Ireland attractive to skilled migrants
from around the world, but this situation will change as the relative labour market conditions
in Ireland evolve in the future.  At the very least, a policy allowing temporary migrants longer
spells in the Irish economy and more latitude in searching for employment would make
Ireland more attractive to those with general skills, and would reduce the potential for
employers to extract monopsony profits from their immigrant work force.  
One might also question whether temporary contracted migration of low-skilled
workers is desirable over the longer run.  These immigrants may fill short-run shortages in the
supply of unskilled labour, but they are likely to have difficulty adapting to changing labour
market conditions should they remain permanently in Ireland.  Ample evidence exists that
temporary migrants are less likely to invest in host country specific human capital than
individuals intending to migrate on a permanent basis.
22  This points to the potential
emergence of a vicious cycle: the permanent settlement of what were intended to be
temporary immigrants is unlikely to be well-received by the domestic population, particularly
if they do not adjust well into Irish labour market over the longer run.  A hardening of Irish
attitudes towards migration would lead to demand for greater restrictions, and the benefits of
greater ethnic diversity would be lost.
23 
22 A recent example is Dustmann (2001)
23 Note also that the benefits of diversity are likely to be larger if immigration is permanent.  It would be
possible in principle to  operate a “balanced” temporary migration scheme, but interactions between the
ethnic majority and minority groups are likely to be less frequent if immigrants have a reduced incentive to
assimilate into the traditions and culture of the host economy.
23If Ireland were to move towards a migration policy favouring permanent migration,
what options ought to be considered?  One possibility is the introduction of a points system,
as currently in place in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.  A point system selects
immigrants on the basis of characteristics associated with likely success in the host country
labour market.  In the Canadian case, immigrants with a minimum of one year of work
experience in managerial, professional, and skilled technical occupations are eligible to apply
for entry as independent immigrants.  The majority of points are awarded predominantly for
general human capital characteristics: education, language ability, labour market experience,
and age.  Additional points are allocated to arranged employment and “adaptability”, which
reflects past employment and contacts in Canada, the education of the spouse of an
immigrant, and previous employment experience in Canada.
24  
The virtue of a points system is it can be used to screen out a pool of suitably skilled
immigrants from the population of potential immigrants.  The number of immigrants admitted
from this pool can be varied from year to year, depending on current conditions in the
domestic labour market.  The virtues of the point system have also stood up to empirical
scrutiny.  Borjas (1990) identifies the presence of a point system as one reason for which
Canadian immigrants since the 1960s have been more skilled than their American
counterparts.  Green and Green (1995) also find that the introduction of the points system has
helped slant the Canadian immigrant population towards higher levels of skill.  The
introduction of a points system would seem a good way to select highly educated and
adaptable immigrant for potential permanent migration  to Ireland.
24 The province of Quebec operates a separate immigration policy, in which points allocated to targeted
occupations have a substantial influence on the selection process.
24Immigration and the Irish population in the longer run
This paper's review of Irish immigrant skills suggest that Ireland has had the fortune to
mainly attract skilled economic migrants.  The message one can take from the analysis above
is that this should be expected to continue to continue in the near future, perhaps with some
assistance from the introduction of a points-type system.  The permanent settlement of
economic migrants will, however, in due course lead to increasing levels of non-economic
migration.  The “friends and family effect” will lead to demand for family reunification
following initial permanent settlement.  In some sense this is unavoidable; countries might
wish to limit migration by operating policies of contracted temporary migration, but these
flows are unlikely to remain temporary so long as labour market conditions in Ireland are
attractive.  A policy that spells out the legal rights of permanent immigrants in this regard is
no doubt preferable to a situation in which illegal or semi-legal temporary migrants in Ireland
attempt to smuggle in family members as tourists and the like.  This will likely have an
impact on the skills of Irish immigrants.  Family migrants are not likely to be self-selected in
the same way as economic migrants.  Borjas and Bronars (1991) suggest that in the case of
sequential family migration, members who benefit most from potential migration will be the
first movers, with less suited family members to follow.  Empirical evidence from North
America tends to support this perspective.  Green and Green (1995) report that while the
points system is highly effective on the margin, its overall impact on immigrant skill level is
muted by growing numbers of non-economic migrants.  
While the evidence listed in Table 1 suggests little relationship between immigrant
education and average education in the source country among Irish migrants, this
presumption may not hold once family reunification becomes an important source of
25immigrants.  In the longer run, the average educational attainment of source countries may
become a more important predictor of the characteristics of the Irish immigrant population.
In the medium term, this is likely to have a modest effect on immigrant skills; European
countries dominate Irish immigrant stocks, and be they in the EU, the accession states, or
further east, these sources have relatively high levels of average education.  In the longer run,
inflows of economic migrants from developing countries outside of Europe will be joined by
family.  Current schooling levels in these source countries are below the European norm; if
this continues to be the case, immigrant skills are likely to decline.  This does not mean that
Ireland ought to limit access to family reunification in preparation for this possibility.  The
morality of denying current Irish immigrants from developing countries the possibility to
bring their families to Ireland, while many less-skilled European immigrants will do so, is
questionable at best.  It is also likely that if the first generation of these immigrants are highly
skilled and well integrated in the Irish economy, this will lead to positive spillover effects that
will ease the assimilation of later generation of immigrants. Better adjusted (permanent)
immigrants today will enhance the prospects for successive generations.      
Conclusions
Immigration is at the heart of major policy debates in most of the world's leading
economies.     Ireland is no longer exempt for this debate, as prosperity has led to significant
migration of overseas immigrants into Ireland.  What should be the objectives of Irish
immigration policy?  While there is little evidence that immigration has a large impact on
wages and employment in contemporary labour markets, it is also unlikely that immigration is
a highly effective solution to economic problems such as short-run labour shortages, an aging
population, or the attraction of foreign investment.  Some benefits may flow from the
26promotion of trade or the increased diversity of the domestic population.  Policy can play an
important role, however, in shaping the selection of migrants that enter Ireland.  Policies
geared towards the admission of skilled economic migrants are likely to enhance any benefits
that do flow from immigration.  They are also likely to result in an  immigrant community
that adapts well to labour market conditions in Ireland and enhances the reputation of the
foreign-born among the native-born population.
Evidence on education suggests that Ireland has mainly attracted skilled immigrants as
part of recent inflows.  Immigrants from within the EEA are highly educated, a pattern that
appears to the self-selection theory developed by Borjas (1987).  Outside of the EEA, the
evidence is more mixed.  While about 75 percent of work permit holders are contracted to
work in unskilled occupations , data on education suggests that many source countries outside
of the EEA are supplying Ireland with highly qualified immigrants.  This would appear to be
due to the economic conditions that prevail in Ireland, rather than a result of the policy regime
that selects immigrants.  High returns to skill in Ireland are attractive to educated immigrants,
who may be willing to enter Ireland in unskilled employment with the intention of moving up
the job ladder in subsequent years. 
What policy alternatives need to be considered for the future?  One option is the
development of a policy regime that encourages the immigration of skilled individuals on a
permanent basis.  A substantial share of today's temporary immigrants will establish a
permanent foothold in Ireland.  The current policy, which favours the employer-led
recruitment of foreign labour into mainly unskilled employment, is unlikely to enhance the
skills level of the Irish immigrant population in the longer run.  A permanent migration policy
that offers immigrants the same rights in the Irish labour market as EEA nationals will
enhance the economic assimilation of Irish immigrants, and will expand the benefits
27associated with trade and diversity.  A points system that selects immigrants on the basis of
general human capital characteristics  has proved an effective device to select economic
migrates who are likely to adapt well in the host economy.
Finally, it should be noted that non-economic migration is likely to grow in
importance in Ireland.  Part of these flows consist of refugees and asylum seekers arriving in
Ireland for humanitarian reasons.  They will soon be joined by immigrants seeking family
reunification with relatives who have already established themselves in Ireland.  While family
migrants are unlikely to be self-selected in the same way as earlier economic migrants, it will
provide difficult to justify their exclusion from the state.  Once again, a sensible policy would
appear to be one that allows for the permanent migration of skilled economic migrants.  A
well-integrated first-generation of immigrant arrivals will enhance the economic prospects of
those that follow.
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31Table 1: Irish immigrant stock and educational attainment, 2002









United Kingdom 248515 .34 .37 9.4
United States 21541 .59 .17 12.1
Nigeria 9225 .51 .19 ---
Germany 8770 .50 .15 10.2
France 6815 .70 .06 7.9
South Africa 6260 .56 .11 6.1
Australia 6107 .56 .14 10.9
Romania 5838 .28 .31 9.5
China (PR) 5669 .46 .17 6.4
Spain 4632 .71 .08 7.3
Philippines 4086 .83 .06 8.2
Canada 4081 .59 .15 11.6
Italy 3705 .48 .24 7.2
Netherlands 3512 .54 .14 9.4
India 3402 .73 .11 5.1
Pakistan 3391 .68 .17 3.9
Russia 2556 .61 .12 10.0 (“USSR”)
Latvia 2281 .22 .18 9.5
New Zealand 2256 .61 .09 11.7
Malaysia 2195 .48 .20 6.8
Source: Immigrant stocks and education are from OECD (2003).  Source country education
data is from Barro and Lee (2000).
32Table 2: Immigrant education around Europe
Source Country Host  Country
France Belgium Spain United
Kingdom
Ireland
United Kingdom .50 [76423] .43 [23390] .26 [91560] --- .34 [207320]
United States .62 [32321] .58 [10594] .53 [15310] .60 [126482] .59 [14609]
Nigeria .44 [2491] .36 [1460] .13 [8289] .57 [79880] .51 [7355]
Germany .29 [198297] .25 [73442] .28 [131927] .31 [231332] .50 [7622]
France --- .20 [141904] .28 [140394] .60 [85179] .70 [6161]
South Africa .42 [2875] .40 [2269] .38 [1172] .47 [124658] .56 [5029]
Australia .48 [3656] .48 [926] .34 [3467] .54 [96889] .56 [4377]
Romania .47 [21997] .43 [6244] .13 [50910] .56 [6662] .28 [4388]
China (PR) .25 [31334] .31 [6019] .10 [24312] .47 [47850] .46 [5497]
Spain .09 [336699] .15 [35548] --- .45 [50337] .71 [4391]
Philippines .30 [5870] .27 [5057] .20 [15987] .51 [38069] .83 [3926]
Canada .52 [16179] .45 [3547] .47 [3282] .48 [66858] .59 [3332]
Italy .07 [403547] .07 [129908] .34 [22777] .27 [103466] .48 [3469]
Netherlands .45 [26006] .25 [89317] .32 [20068] .51 [35043] .54 [2903]
India .21 [26403] .28 [7935] .17 [7067] .33 [454501] .73 [3113]
Pakistan .11 [10813] .17 [3954] .08 [9426] .19 [301892] .68 [2791]
Russia .48 [15738] .41 [9444]a .36 [10543] .67 [13281] .61 [1959]
Latvia .39 [749] .40 [132]a .23 [435] .36 [4070] .22 [2182]
New Zealand .57 [885] .47 [271] .57 [272] .55 [54608] .61 [1996]













Notes: Listed is the proportion of the immigrant stock in each country with third-level
education.  Number of observations (the size of the stock) is in square brackets.
a – The Russian figure for Belgium corresponds to immigrants recorded as being from the
former USSR.  The Latvian figure should also be regarded with caution, as a proportion of
actual Latvians are likely to be included in the USSR category
Source: OECD (2003)
33Table 3 – Income inequality in EU and accession states
A –EU states B – Accession states
Country P90/P10 Country P90/P10
Netherlands 2.98 Slovak Republic 2.88
Germany 3.18 Czech Republic 3.01
France 3.54 Hungary 3.57
Spain 3.96 Poland 3.59
Italy 4.33 Estonia 5.08
Ireland 4.57
UK 4.58
Source: Nolan and Smeeding (2004).















Philippines 3255 4042 4301 .83 .48
Ukraine 2092 2866 2137 .50 .28
Romania 2459 2527 2113 .28 .27
South Africa 2273 2468 2031 .55 .51
Poland 3142 4808 1915 .35 .27
Brazil 1327 1554 1512 .25 .28
Latvia 3985 4160 1363 .22 .41
China 1236 1593 1284 .46 .40
India 845 1030 1253 .73 .54
Lithuania 3816 4551 1238 .30 .23
Turkey 155 466 1191 .45 .07
Bangladesh 767 1038 1009 .48 .29
United States 792 961 927 .59 .51
Australia 1116 1149 908 .56 .47
Malaysia 1086 1030 886 .48 .53
Pakistan 840 830 846 .68 .32
Russia 1238 1091 795 .61 .44
Belarus 870 1028 760 .61 .25
New Zealand 569 658 550 .61 .45
Nigeria 87 84 60 .51 .57
Source: DETE, OECD (2003).  
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Belarus 818 3 1 16 11 22 13 19 16
Latvia 3621 1 .3 11 2 18 14 31 24
Lithuania 3563 2 1 13 3 20 16 22 24
Russia 1084 15 2 13 4 16 17 12 22
Ukraine 1950 2 .3 10 1 16 15 31 24
Poland 2921 11 1 9 1 14 34 8 30
Romania 2316 5 1 24 1 20 16 11 24
Turkey 137 13 1 35 3 12 18 4 16
A u s t r a l i a 9 9 8 6 0 6935629
N e w  Z e a l a n d 4 8 5 5 461 01 41 231 1
USA 717 56 4 11 3 4 4 1 9
Bangladesh 733 4 1 50 1 27 6 1 11
China 1145 12 1 49 1 14 14 2 8
India 751 39 1 36 2 6 7 .3 9
Malaysia 974 28 1 51 1 14 1 --- 3
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Philippines 2989 4 1 53 2 16 7 1 14
Brazil 1274 3 1 3 1 10 54 4 26
South Africa 2094 35 3 19 6 13 12 2 10
Source: Ruhs (2003).  
Notes: Professional occupations include those defined as “managerial, professional. And associate professional or technical” in Ruhs (2004).  Personal
service is the “personal and protective service” category, and craft and operative combines these two categories from the original source.  Information
on the occupation of permit holders is only available from February 2002 onwards.  Row totals may not add up to 100 due to rounding.
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